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uked for might be abused, the prudent course would not be to deny the needed authority, but to draft a cause of action for damaie8 to rectify possible misapplication,
or to provide for a sunset of the authority after a period of time sufficient to meet
the present exigency. The possibility of abuse should not ob8CUJ'e the present need
and the supposition of trust that one must have if our democratic order is to be safeguarded from those outside our borders who wish to subvert it.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning.

Chairman FEINGOLD. Thank you, Dean. I am intrigued by this
distinction between constitutional law and constitutional policy. I
do think that there are questions of constitutional law here, but
surely if there is such a separate area as constitutional policy, that
is even more our responsibility than the United States Supreme
Court because we are here to make policy. But I do appreciate your
testimony.
Now, I would like to turn to Professor David Cole. Professor Cole
currently teaches at Georgetown University Law Center and he has
long been associated with the Center for Constitutional Rights. In
addition to litigating several impo~t First Amendment before
the United States Supreme Court, P fessor Cole has written extensively on the issue before us today, ~o-authoring the book Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name
of National Security.
I welcome you, Professor, and you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF DAVID COLE, PROFESSOR OF LAW,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. COLE. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Precisely because the terrorists violated every principle of civilized society, of human decency and of the rule of law, we must,
in responding to the threat of terrorism, maintain our commitments to principle. I want to suggest three principles.
First, we should not overreact, as we have so often overreacted
in the past in times of fear.
Second, we should not sacrifice the constitutional principles for
which we stand.
Third, in balancing liberty and security, we should not trade the
liberties of a vulnerable group-immigrants, and particularly Arab
and Muslim immigrants-for the security of the majority.
Unfortunately, the immigration provisions that have been advanced by the Bush administration, that have been proposed in the
House ana that are now being considered in the Senate-Justice Department negotiation violate all three principles. They overreact
because they impose guilt by association for wholly innocent
associational activity, and they authorize indefinite detention on
the Attorney General's say-so of any such aJien.
They sacrifice our constitutional principles, and this is constitutional law, not constitutional policr.. Guilt by association, the Supreme Court says, violates the FIfth Amendment and the First
Amendment, both of which apply, the Supreme Court has said,
without distinction to Citizens and aliens living here.
Executive detention without any showing of current dangerousness or risk of flight, which is what the mandatory detention provision in the House bill would authorize, violates both substantive
due process and procedural due process. And in reacting this way,
we are trading the liberties of the few, of those without a voice, of
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immigrants who can't vote, and particularly Arabs and Muslims,
for the purported security of the rest of us.
These are provisions which will, we know, be targeted at Arabs
and Muslims, and not for their individual conduct, but for their
group identity, the very type of thinking that underlies the hate
crimes that we all so virulently 0ppoEe.
First, guilt by association. Current law makes aliens deportable
for terrorist activity, for supporting terrorist activity, for planning,
facilitating, or encouraging terrorist activity any way, shape or
form. The Bush proposal makes aliens deportable for any
88sociational sUl>port of any group that has ever engaged in or used
violence. There 18 no requirement of any nexus between the alien's
support and the actual violence.
If an immigrant in the 1980s gave money to the Mrican National
Congress to support its non-violent struggles against apartheid,
just as thousands of Americans did, he would be deportable under
this statute for rrovidin g support to a terrorist organization. The
African Nationa Con~ss also engaged in violent opposition to
apartheid. The Aftican-National Congress was listed every year
until it came to power as a terrorist organization by the Secretary
of State. That wholly innocent activity would be a deportable activity. Is that a measured response? No.
Even if the alien shows that his support was designed .to counter
terrorist activity, that is no defense. So if an alien today wants to
further the peace process in England by p,roviding peacemaking
training to the IRA, he is deportable. Even If he can prove that his
support furthered peace and countered terrorism, he is deportable.
Is that a measured response? I sugffest no.
The mandatory detention proviSIons are also clearly and plainly
unconstitutional, for two reasons. First of all, they are essentially
a form of preventive detention. The Supreme Court has held that
preventive detention is only permissible under narrow circumstances where the Government shows dangerousnebd to others
or risk of flight. Under the House bill and the Bush proposal, the
Government would be permitted to engage in preventIve detention
without any showing of dangerousness to others or risk of flight.
Under the House bill, all they have to show is that they have
. reasonable grounds to believe that someone is described in the terrorist activity provisions of the bill. But then the terrorist activity
provisions of the bill are defined so broadly that they include every
- violent crime other than an armed robbery-every violent crime
other than an armed robbery. That is not what the man on the
street understands to be terrorism, that is not what the international community understands to be terrorism, and that is not
a narrow class of people who pose a particular danger to society.
Yet, that is the class of people who would be subject to mandatory
detention under this provision.
In addition, it would apply to people who gave money to the African National Congress or who gave peace-making training to the
IRA. Even if there is no evidence that those people pose a threat
to national security or pose a risk of flight, the statute would authorize their detention.
The second problem: it authorizes indefinite detention. There .
have been news reports that have suggested erroneously that the
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HOUBe so),,-es this problem by requiring the filing of charges within
seven days. That is wrong because whether or not charges are filed
doesn't matter. The statute provides that mandatory indefinite detention of aliens is permitted.
Even if the alienlrevaiJs in his deportation proceeding and cannot be removed an has a right. to remain here permanently, the
statute provides for mandatory detection, not on a finding that the
alien is a danger to society, but solely on a finding that the- Attorney General had reasonable grounds to believe that he engaged in
a crime of violence, that he was in a domestic dispute where he
picked up a plate and threw it at his wife, or he was in a bar and
picked up a broken bottle. That would constitute sufficient grounds
for mandatory detention. That, I submit, is not a narrow, measured
response. It is not the kind of careful consideration of civil liberties
that we should be demanding in this time of fear. It is unfortunately precisely the kind of overreacting that we have so often seen
in the past.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:]
STATEMENT OF DAVID COLE,' PROFESSOR OF LAw, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

LAw

INTRODUCTION
The deplorable and horrific attacks of September 11 have shocked and stunned
us all, and have quite properly spurred' renewed consideration of our capability to
forestall future attacks. Yet in domg 80, we must not rashly trample upon the very
freedoms that we are fighting for.
Nothing tests our commitments to principle like fear and terror. But as we take
up what President Bush has called a fight for our freedoms, we must maintain our
commitments to those freedoms at home. The attack of September 11, and in particular the fact that our intelligence agencies missed it entirely, requires a review
of our law enforcement and intelligence authorities. Everyone agrees that more
should be done to ensure the safety of American citizens at home and abroad. But
we must be careful not to overreact, and should therefore insist that any response
be measured and effective.
Three principles must guide our response to threat of terrorism. First, we should
not overreact In a time of fear, a mistake we have made all too often in the past.
Second, we should not sacrifice the bedrock foundations of our constitutional democracy-political freedom and equal treatment. And third, in balancing liberty and securitr, we should not trade a vulnerable minority's liberties, namely the liberties of
iIllD11grants in general or Arab and Muslim immigrants in particular, for the security of the rest of us.
The Administration's proposal seeks a wide range of new law enforcement powers.
I will focus my remarks on the immigration section of the Administration proposal.
In doing so, I will also refer to the Sensenbrenner·Conyers bini referred to as the
PATRIOT Act, recently introduced in the House. In my view, tne Administration's
proposal is neither measured nor effective, and unnecessarily sacrifices our commitment to both equal treatment and political freedom. The PATRIOT Act mitigates
some of the troubling aspects of the Administration's proposal, but remaine deeply
problematic, and unconstitutional in several respects. I will focus my remarks on
the Administration's proposal, but will also note where the PATRIOT Act differs.
The Administration's proposal has four fundamental flaws:
1) It indulges in guilt by association, a concept that the Supreme Court has
rejected as "alien to the traditions of a free society and the First Amend·
ment itselC NAACP v. Claipbme Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982).
2) It would apply its newly expanded deportation grounds for associational
activity retroactively, making aliens deportable for activity that was wholly
legal at the time they engaged in it.
I Profeesor, Georgetown University Law Center, and attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights.
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3) It authorizes the INS to detain immigrants potentially indp.finitely, even
where they cannot be deported and have a legal right to live here permanently.
4) It resurrecte ideological exclusion-the notion that people can be excluded for their political beliefs-a concept Congress repudiated in 1990
when it repealed the McCarran-Walter Act.
HISTORY
I will address each of these problems in turn. But before doing so, it is worth reviewing a little history. This is not the first time we have responded to fear by targeting immigrants and treating them as suspect because of their group identities
rather than their individual conduct.
In 1919, a series of politically motivated bombin~ culminated in the bombing of
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's home here In Washington, DC. Federal au·
thorities responded by rounding up 6,000 suspected immigrants in 33 cities across
the country. not for their part in the bombinlfs, but for their political affiliations.
They were detained in overcrowded "bull pens, and beaten into signing confessions.
Many of those arrested turned out to be citizens. In the end, 556 were deported,
but for their political affiliations, not for their part in the bombings.
In World War II, the attack on Pearl Harbor led to the internment of over 100,000
persons, over two-thirds of whom were citizens of the United States, not because
of individualized determinations that they posed a threat to national securitr or the
war effort, but solely for their Japanese ancestry. The internment began 10 April
1942, and the last camp was not closed until four years later, in March 1946.
In the McCarthy era, we made it a Crime even to be a member of the Communist
Party, and passed the McCarran·Walter Act, which authorized the government to
keep out and expel noncitizens who advocated Communism or other proscribed
ideas. or who belonged to the Communist Party or other groups that advocated proscribed ideas. Under the McCarren·Walter Act, the United States denied visas to,
among others, writers Gabriel Garcia Marques and Carlos Fuentes, and to Nino
Pasti, former Deputy Commander of NATO, because he was going to speak against
the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles.
We have learned from these mistakes. The Palmer Raids are seen as an embar·
rassment. In 1988, Congress paid restitution to the Japanese internees. In 1990,
Congress repealed the McCarran-Walter Act p'?litical exclusion and deportation
growlds. But at the time these actions were irutially taken, they all appeared rea·
sonable in light of the threats we faced. This history should caution us to ask care·
fully whether we have responded today in ways that avoid overreaction and are
measured. to balance liberty and security. In several respects detailed below, the
Administration's proposed Anti-Terrorism Act fails that test.
COUNTERTERRORISM AUTHORITY IN EXISTING LAW
In considering whether the Administration's bill is necessary, it is important to
know what authority the government already has to deny admission to, detain, and
deport aliens engaged in terrorist activity. The government already has extremely
broad authority to act against any alien involved in or supporting any kind of ter·
rorist activity:
1. It may detain without bond any alien with any visa status violation ifit
institutes removal proceedings and has reason to believe that he poses a
threat to national security or a risk of flight. The alien need not be charged
with terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 8 C.F.R. § 241 The INS contends
that it may detain such aliens on the basis of secret evidence presented in
camera and ex parte to an immigration judge.
2. It may deny entry to any alien it has reason to believe may engage inany
unJawful activity in the United States, and to any member of a desigtlated
terrorist group. It may do so on the basis of secret evidence. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(aX3).
3. It may deport any alien who has engaged in terrorist activity. or supported terronst activity in any way. Terrorist activity is defined under exIsting law very broadly, to include virtually any use or threat to use a fire·
arm with intent to endanger person or property (other than for mere per·
sonal monetary gain), and any provision of support for such activity. 8
U.S.C. § 1227(aX4). Pursuant to the Alien Terrorist Removal provisions in
the 1996 Antiterrorism Act, the INS may use secret evidence to establish
deportability on terrorist activity grounds.
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4. Relatedly, the Secretary of State haa broad, largely unreviewable authority under the 1996 Anti-Tem)Jism and Effective Death Penalty Act to dea{gnate "foreign terrorist organizations" and thereby criminalize all material
support to such Jroupa. 8 U.S.C. § 1189, 18 U.S.C. §2339B. This provision
triggers criminal sanctions, and applies to immigrants and citizens alike.
Osama bin Laden's organization is 80 designated, and thus it is a crime,
P?JlUhabJe by up to 10 yean in prison, to provide any material support to
his group.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED ANTI-TERRORISM ACT
The immigration provisions of the Administration's Anti-Terrorism Act: (1) expand the grounds for deporting and denying entry to noncitizens; (2) expand the
Secretary of State's authority to designate and cut off' funding to "foreign terrorist
orga~tionst (3) create a new mandato!)' detention procedure for aliens certified
as terrorists by the INS; (4) authorize the Secretary of State to share certain immigration file information with foreign governments; and (5) require the FBI and the
Attorney General to share certain crilhinal history data with the INS and the State
De~artment to improve visa decision making.
The most troubling provisions are the expanded grounds for deportation and exclusion, and the new mandatory detention pi'ocedure.
A. THE ADMINISTRATION BILL IMPOSES GUILT BY ASSOCIATION

The term "terrorism" has the capacity to stop debate. Everyone opposes terrorism,
which is commonly understcod to describe premeditated, politicallr-motivated violence directed at noncombatants. See 22 U.S.C. §2656ftd)(2) (defirung terrorism 88
"premeditated, politically motivated violence pe~trated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents ).
.
The INA, however, defines "terrorist activity" much more broadly, and under the
Administration bill would define it beyond any common understanding of the term.
Under current law, the INA defines "terrorist activity" to include any use or threat
to use an "explosive or firearm (other than for mere ~r80nal monetary gain) with
intent to endanger ... the safety of one or more indiVIduals or to cause substantial
damage to property." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(aX3XBXii). Under the Administration bill, this
would be expanded to inchlde the use or threat to use any "explosive, firearm or
other weapon or da~eroU8 device" with the intent to endan~er person or p:operty.
Section 201(a)(1)(BXh). This defirution encompasses a domestIC disturbance in which
one party picks up a knife, a barroom brawl in which one party threatens another
with a broken beer bottle, and a demonstration in which a rock is thrown at another
person. It would also apply to any armed struggle in a civil war, even against regimes that we consider totalitarian, dictatorial, or genocidal. Under this definition,
•
all freedom fighters are terrorists. 2
The PATRIOT Act would define "terrorist activity" even more broadly; to include
the use of "any object" with intent to endanger person or property. Under this bill
a demonstrator who threw a rock during a political demonstration would be treated
as a "terrorist."
The point is not that such routine acts of violence are acceptable, or that armed
struggle is generally penniaaible. But to call virtually every crime of violence "terrorism" is to trivialize the term. And because 80 much else in the Administration
bilI and the PATRIOT Act turns on "terrorist activity," it is critical to keep in mind
the stunning overbreadth of this definition. Government action that might seem reasonable vis-a-vis a hijacker may not be justified vis-a-vis an immigrant who found
himself in a bar fight, threw a rock during a demonstration, or who sent humanitarian aid to an organization involved in civil war. Yet the Administration bill
draws no distinction between the hijacker, the humanitarian, the political demonstrator, and the barroom brawler,
2In his testimon,Y, Douglas Kmiec defends this expansion b'y erroneously stating that under
current law, "an aJlen is insdmiMible and deportable for engagmg in terrorist activity only when
the alien has usied explosives or fairares." Kmiec Statl!ment at 7. Therefore he &rgUaa, the
change is needed ~ encompass attacks like those of September 11. That ill plainly wrong. In
ita current from 8 U.S,C. I82(aX3)(B)(ii) already defines "terrorist activity" to include, among
other things, "higlijackin.i or sabotage of any conveyance (including a governmental organiulion) to do or abStain from doing any att as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of
the individual eeizeod or detained: "a.ua.ssination,"the use of any biological, chemical, or nuclear
weapvn, and the use or threat to U8e any explosive or firearm against person or property (other
than for mere pel'8OnaJ monetary again). Thua, no rewriting of the act is required to reach the
conduct of September 11.
.
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The breadth of "terrorist activity" is expanded still further by the Administration's
proposed redefinition of "engage in terrorist activity.~ Under current law, that term
IS defined to include eng~g in or supJ;>Orting terrorist activity in any way. 8
U.S.C. § 1182(aX3XBXiii). The Administration proposes to exeand it to include anr.
associational activity in support of a "terrorist organization. Section 201(aXIXC .
And because the INS has argued that a terrorist organization is any group that has
ever engaged in terrorist activity, as defined in the INA, irrespective of any lawful
activities that the group engages in, this definition would potentially reach any
group that ever used or threatened to use a "firearm or other weapon~ against person or property.3
The Administration's bill contains no requirement that the alien's support have
any connection whatsoever to terrorist activity. Thus, an alien who sent coloring
boOks to a day-care center run by an organization that was ever involved in armed
struggle would appear to be deportable as a terrorist, even if she could show that
the coloring books were used only by l3-year olds. Indeed, the law apparently extends even to those who seek to support a group in the interest of countering terrorism. Thus, an immigrant-who offered his sel'Vlces in peace negotiating to the IRA
in the hope of furthering the peace process in Great Britain and forestalling further
violence would appear to be deportable as a terrorist.
The bill also contains no r~uirement that the organization's use of violence be
contemporaneous with the aid vovided. An alien would appear to be deportable as
a terrorist for making a JonatlC... ) to the Mrican National Congress today, because
fifteen years ago it used military as well as peaceful means to oppose apartneid.
And unlike the 1996 statute barring fundinl; to designated foreign terrorist
groups, the Administration bill does not distinguIsh between foreign and domestic
organizations. Thus, immigrants would appear to be deportable as terrorists for paring dues to an American pro-life f~UP or environmental organization that ever 10
its_past used or threatened to use a weapon against person or property.
The net effect of the Administration's expansion of the defimtion of "engage in ter·
rorist activity" and "terrorist activity" is to make a substantial amount of wholly innocent, nonviolent associational conduct a deportable offense. By severing any tie
between the support provided and terrorist activity of any kind, the bill indulges
in guilt by association. Douglas Kmiec disputes this assertion in his testimony, but
in doing so refers not to the AdministratIOn's _proposal, but to the PATRIOT Act.
Kmiec Statement at 7. Even as to the PATRIOT Act, however, Professor Kmiec is

Thf'

PATRIOT Act seeks to strike a compromise on the issue of guilt by association. It gives the Administration what it seeks-the power to impose guilt by association-for support of any group designated as a foreign terronst organization by
the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. ~ 1189. An alien who sends humanitarian aid
to a designated foreign terrorist group would be deportable, without more. But for
those groups that are not designated, the bill requires a nexus to terrorist activity:
the alien would be deportable only if he provided support to a non·designated group
in circumstances in which he knew, or reasonably should have known, that his support was furthering terroliGt activity. Thus, for designated groups, the PATRIOT
Act permits guilt by association, but for non-designated groups, the PATRIOT Act
retains the existing requirement that the INS show a nexus between the alien's act
of support and some terrorist activity. The compromise reflected in the PATRIOT
Act thus properly eliminates guilt by association for non-designated groups, but expressly authorizes guilt by association for any organization designated by the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. § 1189.
In my view, the principle that people should be held responsible for their own individual" conduct, and not for the wron«doing of those with whom they are merely
associated, brooks no compromise. GUilt by association, the Supreme Court has
ruled, violates the First and the Fifth Amendments. 4 It viola~ the First Amend3 In the Administration draft circulated Wednesday, September 19. terrorist organization was
ellpreuly defined w include any group that has ever engaged in or provided material support
to a terrorist activity, irrespective of any other fully lawful activities that the group may engage
in. In the revised draft circulated Thursday, September 20! the bill deleted the definition of terrorist organization, but still made any support of a terronst organization a deportable offense.
This is even worse from a notice perspective, as it makes aliens deportable for providing support
to an entity that is underfined. In litigation, the INS has argued that the term Uterrorist organi·
zation" means any group that has ever committed "terrorist activity." as the tenn is defined in
the INA.
4The First and Fifth amendments apply to citizens and aliens residin in the United States.
Kwong Hoi Chew v. Colding. 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953). Mr. Kmiec 8u~st that this is wrong
beca\llle the First and Fifth Amendments do not extend w aliens seeking entry from abroad.
Kmiec Statement at 8. But of course such aliens are not residing in the United States. The Suo

.~-.
/
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ment becauae people have a riJrht to auoc:iate with groups that have lawful and unlawful ends. Accordingly, the Court haa ruled that one can be held ~naible for
one's aaaociational ties to a group ~ if the government proves "specific intent" to
further the group's unlawful endS. Un~d Stales v. &bel, 389 U.S. 258,262 (1967).
Guilt by' 8a8Odation also violates the FiftJi Amendment, becauae "in our juri1ru.
dence guilt is personal." Scak8 v. United Statu, 367 U.S. 203. (1961). To hoI an
alien responsible for the military acta of the ANC fifteen yean ago becauae he offen
a donation today, or for providing peace negotiating training to the IRA, violates
that principle. Without some connection between the alien's support and terrorist
actiVity, the Constitution is violated. Douglas Kmiec argues that the guilt by association cases "deai with domestic civil rights." Kmiec Statement .at 7.10 fact, this
principle was developed with respect to association with the Communist Party, an
orgaruzation that Conpess found to be, and the Supreme Court accepted as, a foreign-dorninated orgaruzation that used &8bota~ and terrorism for the purnose of
overthrowing the United States by force and VIolence. Yet even as it accepte<J those
findings as to the Communist P4rty, the Court held that guilt by aSSOClation was
no.tpennissible.
.
The guilt by association provisions of the Administration bill also suffer from tre·
mendous notice problems. In the most recent draft, "terrorist organization" is wholly
undefined, yet an alien can lose his right to remain in this country for supporting
such an undefined entity. Is a terrorist organization one that engages exclusively
in terrori8Dl, primarilr ill terrorism, engagea in terrorism now, or ever engaged in
terrorism? The definition proff",red in the Administration's Wednesday draft, and argued for by the INS in litigatIon, does not solve the notice problem, because it is
80 broad that it encompas8e8 literally thousands of groups that ever used or threatened to use a weapon. Any alien who so~ht to provide humanitarian aid to any
group would have to conduct an extensive mvestigation to ensure that neither the
organization nor any subgroup of it ever used or threatened to use a weapon.
.
Congress repudiated guilt by' association in 1990 when it repealed the McCarranWalter Act/rovisions of the INA, which made proscribed association a deportable
offense, an had long been criticized as being inconsistent with our commitments
to political freedom. In 1989, a federal district court declared the McCarran-Walter
Act provisions lunconstitutional. American·Arab Anti·Discrimination Comm. v.
Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd in part and affd in part on other
grounds, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1991). In 1990, Congress repealed those provisions.
Yet the Administration would resurrect this long-rejected and unconstitutional philosophy.
B.

TIlE
ADMINISTRATION'S
BILL WOULD
APPLY
ITS
EXPANDED
GROUNDS
FORDEPORTATION RETROACTIVELY, so THAT ALIENS WOULD BE DEPORTED FOR CONDUCT FULLY LAWFUL AT THE TIME THEY ENGAGED m IT

The expansive definitions of "terrorist activity" and "engage in terrorist activity"
detailed above are exacerbated by the fact that they apply retroactively, to conduct
engaged in before the effective date of the Act. Since the principal effect of the Administration's new definitions is to render deportable cor.duct that is now wholly
lawful, this raises serious problems of fundamental fairness.
As noted above, aliens are currently deportable for engaging in or supporting terrorist activity. However, the new law would add as new grounds of deportation
wholly innocent and nonviolent associational support of political organizations that
have at .some time used a weapon. activity. Even to apply that ground prospectively
raises substantial First and Fifth Amendment concerns, as noted above. But to
apply it retroactively is grossly unfair.
Moreover, retroactive application would serve no security purpose whatsoever.
Since under current law any alien supportinx terrorist activity is already deportable, the only aliens who would be affected by the bill's retroactive application
wowd be those who were not supporting terrorist activity - the immigrant who donated to the peaceful anti-apartheid activities of the ANC, or who provided peacemaking training to the IRA, or who made a charitable donation of his time or money
preme Court has long distinguished between aliens are not residing in the United States. The
Supreme Court has long distinguished between aliens seeking entry from outaide our borders,
who hsve no constitutional protectiona, and aliena here, whether here legally or illegally. who
are protected by the First and Fifth AMendments to the Constitution. The Court reiterated this
basic point apparently missed by Mr. Kmiec. as recently as last tenn, in ZMlduydtu v Davu,
121 S. Ct. 2491, 2500 (2001) (~onoe an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance Chll!l8es.
(or the due process here is lawful unlawful, temporary, or permanent." The Supreme COurt
could not have been any dearer in COidi"ll, in which it stated that neither Firat or Fifth Amendments "aeknowioldgee any diatinetion- between ~tit.ena and aliena residing here.
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to the lawful activities of an environmental or pro-life group that once engaged in
violence. There ia simply no justification for retroactively imposing on such conduct
- fully lawful today - the penalty of deportation.
The PATRIOT Act largely solves the retroactivity problem, at lea8t with respect
to the guilt by association Pl'9vi8ions, by limiting ita newly expanded grounds or deportation for support of designated terrorist organizations to 8Upport provided after
the deaignations were made. Since the designation already triggers a criminal penalty under current law, most aliens affected by thia provision even for pre-Act conduct would not be able to claim that they were beil!g deported for conduct that was
legal when they engaged in it. However, the PATRIOT Act would present some
retroactivity problama. Under the existing criminal proviai;)n8 for material 8UPP'lrt
to terrorist organizations, it ia lawful to send medicine or religiou8 materials to a
designated group. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Yet the PATRIOT Act would make such conduct, even conduct engaged in before the PATRIOT Act took effect, a deportable offense. There is no warrant for deporting people for providing humanitarian aid at
a time when it was fully legal to do so.
C. THE MANDATORY DETENTION PROVISION SECTION VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BY AUINDEFINITE
UNILATERAL
EXECUTIVE
DETENTION
IRRESPECTIVE
THORIZING
OFWHETHER THE ALIEN CAN BE DEPORTED

The Administration bill would amend current INS de t ~ntion authority to provide
for ~mandatory detention" of aliens certified br. the Attorney General as persons who
may "commit, further, or facilitate acts descnbed in.sections 237(a)(4)(A)(I), (A)(iii),
or (B), or engage in any other activity that endangers the national security of the
United States." Section 202(1)(e)(3). Such persons would be detained indefinitely,
even if they are granted relief from removal, and therefore have a legal right to remain here. This provision would authorize the INS to detain persons whom it has
no authority to deport, and without even instituting deportation proceedin~s against
them, simply on an executive determination that there is "reason to beheve that
the alien "may commit" a "terrorist activity."
To appreciate the extraordinary breadth of this unprecedented power, one must
recall the expansive definition of "terrorist activity" and "engage in terrorist activity" noted above. This bill would mandate detention of any alien who the INS has
"reason to believe" may provide humanitarian aid to the African National Congress,
peace training to the IRA, or might get into a domestic dispute or barroom brawl.
There is surely no warrant for preventive detention of such people, much less mandatory detention on a "reason to believe" standard. Mr. Kmiec, defending the provision, suggests that these examples are unlikely to arise. But the point is that any
provision so broad as to permit such applications is in no way narrowly tailored to
addressing true terrorist threats.
Current law is sufficient to meet the country's needs in fighting terrorism. The
INS is authorized to detain without bond any alien in a removal proceeding who
poses a threat to nati:mal security or a risk of flight. It routinely does so. It also
has authority, as illustrated in recent weeks, to detain aliens without charges for
up to 48 hours, and in extraordinary circumstances, for a reasonable period of time.
This provision raises four basic concerns. First, it is plainly unconstitutional, because it mandates detention of persons who pose no threat to national security or .
risk of flight. If the Attorney General certifies that an individual may provide humanitarian support to a group that has engaged in a civil war, for example, the person is subject to mandatory detention, without any requirement that the alien cur.
rently poses a threat to national security or risk of flight.
The mandatory detention provision is a form of preventive detention prior to trial.
But the Supreme Court has held that "fi]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Preventive detention is constitutional
only in very limited circumstances, where there is a demonstrated need for the detention-because of current dangerousness or risk of flight-and onlr where there
are adequate procedural safeguards. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (upholding preventive
detention only where there is a showing of threat to others or risk of flight, where
the detention is limited in time, and adequate procedural safeguards are provided);
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (civil commitment constitutional only
where individual has a harm-threatening mental illness, and adequate procedural
protections are provided); Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S., Ct. 2491, 249S-99 (2001) (explaining constitutional limits on preventive detention, and interpreting immigration
statute not to permit indefinite detention of deportable aliens). Where there is no
showing that the alien poses a threat to national security or 8 risk of flight, there
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ts no justifieation whatsoever (or detention, and any such detention would violate
subatantive due procesS.
Second, the detention authority proposed would allow the INS to detain aliena indefinitely, even where they have prevailed in their removal ~roceedinn. This, too,
ts patently unconatitutiowil. Once an alien has prevailed in his remov8I pr~,
and baa been granted relief from removal, he has a legal right to remain here. Yet
the Administration p~ would provide that even 8.lien8 granted relief from removal would still be detained.s At that~int, however, the INS has no 184Ptimate
basia for detaining the individual. The INS's authority to detain is only inCIdent to
its removal authority. !fit cannot remove an individual, it baa no baais for detaining
him. Zadvydos v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (holding that INS could not detain indefinitely even aliens flUed deportable where there was no te880nable likelihood that
th~ could be deported because no country would take them).'
Third, the standard for detention is va.sue and insufficiently demanding, and
raiBe8 serious constitutional concerna. It is Important to keep in mind that the bill
propoaes to authorize mandatory and potentially indefinite detention. That is a far
more severe deprivation o( liberty than holding a person for interrogation or trial.
Yet the INS has in litigation argued that "reason to believe" is essentially equivalent to the "reasonable 8UBpicion" required for a brief stop and frisk under the
Fourth Amendment.The Constitution would not permit the INS to detain an alien
indefinitely on mere "reasonable auspicion," a standard which does not even authorize a custodial arrest in criminal law enforcement.
Fourth, and most importantly, it ia critical to the constitution~' of any executive detention provision that the ~reon detained have a meanin
opportunity to
contest his detention both admirustratively and in court. INS v. t. Cyr, 121 S. Ct.
2271 (2001). I read the judicial review provision as authorizing judicial review of
the evidentiary basis for detention, and as authorizing the reviewmg court to order
release if the evidence does not support the Attorney General's determination that
the alien poses a current threat to national security. In any event, such review
would be constitutionally required: aliens may not be deprived of their liberty with·
out notice of the basis for the detention and a meaniniful opportunity to confront
and rebut the evidence against them. See, e.g., Landoll v, PlGsencia, 459 U.S. 21,
34 (1982); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995), Rafeedie v. INS, 880
F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989); AI Najjar v. RenoJ 97 F. Supp,.2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2000);
Ktareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp.2d 402 (D.N.t!. 1999). Uiillateral executive detention
knows no pl!lce in American law.
The PATRIOT Act's mandatory detention provision share many of the above
flaws. Most problematically, it, too, authorizes preventive detention without any
showing that an alien poses any current danger to national security or a risk of
flight. It only requires the Attorney General to certify that an alien "is described"
in various deportation or exclusion provisions. These in<:lude aliens who the Attorney General believes may be mere members of designated foreign terrorist groups,
and any alien involved in a domestic dispute or a barroom brawl In which a weapon
or other object was used with intent to endanger person or property. Even if such
aliens pose no threat to others or risk of flight, they are subject to mandatory detention.
In addition, like the Administration's proposal, the PATRIOT Act permits indefinite detention. The PATRIOT Act adds a requirement that the ~overnment file immigration or criminal charges against an- alien mandatorily detained within 7 days,
but that is a largely irrelevant protection, because the provision authorize8 indefinite detention even of thoae aliens who prevail in their deportation proceedings. The
requirement that charges be filed means nothing if the resolution of those charges
in the alien's favor haa no effect on the detention.
The judicial review provision of the PATRIOT Act marks an improvement on the
Administration proposal by clarifying explicitly that judicial review would include
review of the merits of the Attorney General's certification decision, ~d by barring
5 In many instances,an alien who poBe8 a threat to national security will not be eligible for
discretionary relief.
e While the Court in Zadvyda8 left undecided the question of indefinite detention of a deportable alien where applied "narrowly to 'a amall segment of particularly dangerous individuals,'
say suapecte4 terronsta,~ 121 S. Ct. at 2499, the Court did not decide that such detention would
be permissible ,ince the question was not preeen~. Moreover, the Administration's proposed
definition of "terrorist activity" would not be limited to a narrow, ",mall segment of particularly
dangerous individual,,~ 88 te Court in Zadvydas contemplated, but to garden variety criminals
barroom brawlea, and those who have supported no violent activity whatsoever, but provid;;;{
hl1.llWlitarian IIUpport to the Mean NatioriaJ CoI1gre8ll. It begs credulit] to characterize such
an open-ended authority aa limited to a ".mall eegment of particularly <18ngerous individual....
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delegation "below the INS Commisaioner of the certification decision. But like the
AdmiJiiatration provision, it affords the alien no administrative opportunity tn defend himself, and therefore violates due process.
D. '!HE BILL RESURRECTS IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION, BARRINO ENTRY TO ALIENS BASED
ON PURE SPEECH

The bill would also amend the grounds of inadmiasibility. These grounds would
apply not only to aliens seeking to enter the country for the first time, but also to
aliens living here who seek to apply for various immigration benefits, such as adjustment of status to permanent resident, and to permanent residents seeking to
enter the country after a trip abroad.
The bill expands current law by excluding aliens who "endorse or espouse terrorist activity," or who "persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist
organization," in ways t6at the Secretary of State determines undermine U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. Section 201(aXl). It also excludes aliens who are representatives of groups that "endorse acts of terrorist activity" in ways that similarly
undermine U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.
Excluding people for their ideas is flatly cOntrary to the spirit of freedom for
which the United States stands. It was for that reason that Congress repealed all
such grounds in the INA in 1990, after years of embarraasing visa denials for polit'
.
ical reasons.
Moreover, because of the breadth of the definitions of "terrorist activity" and "terrorist organizations," this authority would empower the government to deny entry
to any alien who advocated support for the ANC, for the contras during the war
against the Sandinistas, or for opposition forces in Afghanistan and Iran today. Because all of these groups have used force or violence, they would be terrorist organizations. and anyone who urged people to support them would be excludable on the
Secretary of State's say-so.
The PATRIOT Act shares this problem, and goes further, by rendering aliens deportable for their speech. However, it qualifiea the deportation provisions with the
requirement that the speech be intended and likely to promote or incite imminent
lawleas action, the constitutional minimum required before speech advocating illegal
conduct can be penalized. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
CONCLUSION
In responding to terrorism, we must ensure that our responses are measuredand
balanced. Is it a measured response to terrorism· to make deportable anyone who
provides humanitarian aid to the African National Congress today? Is it measured
to deport aliens for donating their time to a pro-life group that once engaged in an
act of violence but no longer does so? Is it measured to deport an immigrant who
sends human rights pamphlets to an organization fighting a civil war? Is it measured to label any domestic dispute or barroom fight with a weapon an act of terrorism? Is it measured to subject anyone who might engalfe in such activity subject
to mandatory detention? Is it measured to restore exclUSIOn for ideas? Is it measured to make aliens deportable for peaceful conduct fully lawful at the time they
.
engaged in it?
I submit that the Administration's proposal falls short in all of these respects. The
overbreadth of the bill reflects the overreaction that we have often indulged in when
threatened. The expansive alithorities that the Administration bill grants, moreover,
are not likely to make us safer. To the contrary, by penalizing even wholly lawful,
nonviolent, and counterterrorist associational activity, we are likely to drive such activity underground, to encourage extremists, and to make the communities that will
inevitably be targeted by such broad-brush measures disinclined to cooperate with
law enforcement. As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote nearly 75 years ago, the Framers
of our Constitution knew "that fear breeds I'epression; that repression breeds hate;
and that hate menaces stable government." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927). In other words, freedom and security need not necessarily be traded off
against one another; maintaining our freedoms is itself critical to maintaining our
security.
The Administration'8 bill fails to live up to the very commitments to freedom that
the President has said that we are fighting for. As the Supreme Court wrote in
1967, declaring invalid an anti-Communist law, "'It would indeed be ironic if, in the
name of national defen&e, we would sanction the lubversion of one of those libertiee-the freedom of association-which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile." United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).

